The Beginning of the Twentieth Century: The Path to World War I

Kaiser Wilhelm

INTRODUCTION

Some historians believe that the twentieth century began with World War I.  But how did World War I begin?

The horrors of Europe’s twentieth century were born of this catastrophe; it was, as the American historian Fritz Stern put it, "the first calamity of the twentieth century, the calamity from which all other calamities sprang."

The consequences lasted at least until 1991, the breakup of the Soviet Union, which may mark the end of the twentieth century.  But the immediate cause of the war – instability and wars in the Balkans – reappeared again with the breakup of Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia, which was created after World War I. Rivalry among nations over influence in the Central European "borderlands" continues. Violence in the Middle East is partly a result of the arbitrary national boundaries drawn up by French and British imperialists during World War I.

The economic dislocations caused by World War I were important causes of the onset and length of the Great Depression. The Great Depression was the catalyst that brough Adolf Hitler to power. The most dramatic economic and political events of the twentieth century have deep historical roots.

THE BEGINNING OF THE BREAKUP OF BISMARCK'S EUROPEAN ORDER

In the two books cited in the bibliography, George Kennan, the architect of America's foreign policy at the beginning of the Cold War, gives a detailed account of the slow breakup of the fragile European political order put together by Bismarck. Bismarck's foreign policy was based on isolating France and forging detente among the three conservative monarchies of Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary.

Kennan, as a Russian expert, concentrates on documenting the slow drift of Tsar Alexander III and the Russian political class from a tenuous alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary to withdrawal and opposition. The surprise here, for me, was that the system came apart before Wilhelm became Kaiser and dismissed Bismarck.

As far back as the 1880s the Balkans were a critical area of conflict between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Although the Balkans held almost no interest for Bismarck, he assumed that the continued existence of Germany's ally Austria-Hungary as a "Great Power" was crucial to the maintenance of German security. The problem was that the Tsar and much of the Russian political elite had developed a hatred of Austria-Hungary because of their perception that Austria-Hungary was blocking Russian influence in the Balkans. By extension, they came to believe that Germany supported Austria-Hungary against Russian interests.

In this atmosphere of Russian paranoia, France saw an opportunity to forge a military alliance with Russia against Germany. The military clauses of the treaty were negotiated in secrecy by a very small number of politicians and generals, and never made public in either country until a few years before the war. 

Bismarck believed that a war between Russia and Austria-Hungary ran the large risk of the destruction of one or both of the monarchies. There is a hint that a war might even be a threat to the German monarchy and even the recent German federation he had cobbled together. Later German politicians and generals did not see this risk.

THE BACKGROUND:  TRADITIONAL EUROPEAN POWER POLITICS AND PLAYERS

This part of the post is mostly based on two recent attempts to answer the question of how World War I began.  They are Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers:  How Europe Went to War in 1914 and Margaret Macmillan, The War That Ended Peace:  The Road to 1914.

As Professor Clark says, the origins of the war were “obscure and convoluted.”  The  book concentrates on the words and actions of the small groups of men in each of the five major powers whose collective decisions would lead to war.  It is in some ways an old-fashion history, telling the story of how foreign and military policy was made in a political atmosphere that died with the war.  Although four of the five powers had parliaments, policy makers almost totally ignored them.  German and Russian monarchs appointed ministers and influenced policy. Austria-Hungary's policies were in the hands of the Foreign Secretary and the head of the army's General Staff.  The president of France dominated the prime minister and ignored the legislature.  In England, the foreign secretary, Lord Grey, and a small group of politicians (including Winston Churchill) and military leaders, ignored their own Prime Minister and the majority of their own party in making foreign policy and military commitments to France, in secret.

The author concentrates on the key political decision-makers, using mostly original sources.  As he explains in the Introduction, this is a treacherous undertaking, since much of the content of official documents, memoirs, papers and later interviews were self-serving, falsified, misleading, lost, or revised.  Key conversations were either not recalled truthfully or conveniently forgotten by participants. Almost all memoirs of the key players had the same theme:  I was not responsible for World War I. Yet Professor Clark, in over 500 dense pages, with 150 pages of notes, attempts to use this vast collection of papers to reconstruct the thinking, motivations and actions of the key players.

By concentrating on the internal and often secret communications and conversations of foreign policy-makers in each country, the book conveys the feeling that they were operating in a hermetically-sealed environment.  That seems to be one of the main lessons.  They were all living in societies with tremendous tensions and instabilities. As members of reactionary conservative groups, they opposed or ignored the threats to their power and status from new economic and political groups and forces unleashed by the Industrial Revolution and calls for democracy and liberal reforms inspired by the French Revolution.  These conservative groups, often from the landed aristocracy or related to the monarchs, still controlled the foreign offices and often the highest ranks of the military.  They were playing traditional "Great Power" international politics under changed circumstances they either did not understand or willfully ignored. 

But how did it happen?  The author does a masterful job documenting the diplomatic thinking and actions of the key players in the five powers.  But in the end, as the title suggests, they made a series of decisions over thirty years that cumulatively led to war.  For example, unlike Bismarck, whose flexible policies were to isolate France, avoid any involvement in the Balkans, and accommodate British colonial interests, succeeding German policy-makers under Kaiser Wilhelm took more aggressive steps that eventually led to the anti-German coalition Bismarck feared.  Rising mutual fear and mistrust, including paranoia, made political adjustments increasingly difficult. 

Their thinking seems to have been narrowed by the assumptions they made about European power politics, conditioned by their elite position in their societies.  The military and foreign policy leaders had more in common with their counterparts in the other countries than they did with their own countrymen.  They thought they understood the thinking of their counterparts in opposing countries and could negotiate compromises.  

Yet, in the end, most of the leaders wanted war or thought war was inevitable. Maybe they were not the sleepwalkers in the title of the book, but as they dealt with a series of political crises in the years leading up to 1914, their focus narrowed, military budgets and the size of armies grew rapidly, and political compromises to limit political conflicts became increasingly difficult. The cumulative tension of one crisis after another became almost unbearable and heightened nationalist and xenophobic rhetoric and feeling in all countries.

In reading how the diplomatic conflicts unfolded, it feels like a Greek tragedy, which is one of the author’s intentions.  Like the Peloponnesian War, they would drift into a war that would destroy the polities they led.

HOW DID WORLD WAR I BEGIN?

The immediate trigger was the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, by Bosnian Serb terrorists secretly armed, trained and financed by the Military Intelligence branch of the Serbian army.  That sounds very modern.

Historical tragedy is often accompanied by irony.  Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was probably the only highly-placed person in the Austrian government who wanted a political, rather than military, approach to Serbia.  He was disliked or hated by virtually everyone in the Austrian government, including the Emperor Franz Joseph, who was 83 years old.  After his visit to Sarajevo, Ferdinand intended to sack the aggressive head of the army.  Ferdinand’s funeral arrangements in Vienna were embarrassingly short.  He was buried outside of Vienna, not in the royal tombs.

Now comes the tragedy.  Austrian leaders were concerned over Serbian agitation in the Balkans, increasingly aimed at Austria.  Out of about 52 million people in the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1914, about 30 million were Slavs.  Some wanted out.  Serbian agitation and calls for Slavic solidarity on the borders and inside the Empire resonated.  To "unite" the increasingly restless nationalities inside the Empire and deal with Serbia, the army high command had long advocated war with Serbia. The assassination gave them their opportunity (or excuse). The foreign office presented the Serbian government with a set of demands that they knew could never be agreed to. Surprisingly, Serbia agreed to all but one of the demands and offered a reasonable compromise to a direct threat to their sovereignty. But this was not the usual set of threats and bluffs that led to negotiated compromises in the past. Austria-Hungary's leaders wanted war with Serbia. Only its stronger ally Germany could restrain Austria. It had restrained Austria in 1912 and 1913. But not this time.

The military began improvising an invasion of Serbia. Why improvise?  Because all the great powers only planned on a full mobilization of large numbers of conscripted reserves. It would have been logistically difficult to start with a partial mobilization and then somehow expand to a full mobilization. It was all or nothing. Once full mobilization started, once trains pulled out of the stations, it meant war.

Serbia had an agreement, only recently formalized, that Russia would come to their aid if attacked by Austria.  The Austro-Hungarian Empire would be in dire trouble if it had to fight both Russia and Serbia alone. But the Empire had a formal alliance treaty with Germany.  Since 1909 the Austro-Hungarian army’s commander had been discussing joint military operations against Russia with the German General Staff.  Russia had a secret formal alliance treaty with France, both of whom had an uneasy and vaguely worded alliance with England.  England and Russia had faced off along the southern frontiers of the English empire in the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia.  England supported the Ottoman Empire’s attempt to keep a Russian fleet bottled up in the Black Sea and blocking its access through Turkey into the Mediterranean.  England appeared uncertain that it would come into the war unless Germany violated Belgium neutrality.  At one point, Lord Grey, England's Foreign Secretary, toyed with the idea of reaching some sort of agreement with Germany.  In the past, great European powers had alliances, understandings and treaties with each other but they were fluid, subject to change and realignment, and uncertain in implementation. 

Yet, as 1914 approached, the two alliances seemed to firm up.  Bismarck’s nightmare, a coalition of Russia, France and possibly England aimed at Germany, had become a reality.  Political options seemed to disappear and diplomatic maneuvering on both sides attempted to harden commitments to support allies.  There seemed to be an assumption that war was inevitable and even desirable. If war began, combatants could be reasonably certain that their allies would honor their commitments and enter the war.  And that’s what happened.

Except for England, countries on both sides believed that the key to a quick victory was how fast countries could mobilize their huge army reserves and implement offensive strategies. Russia mobilized first, even while Tsar Nicholas and Kaiser Wilhelm were sending notes to each other saying they did not want war. Too late – the generals on both sides had already set the wheels in motion (literally – mobilization depended critically on railroads). All major powers went directly to full mobilization. Another localized war in the Balkans - the third in three years - was impossible; World War I was about to begin.

The countries of both alliances immediately launched offensives.  Given the military balance of the two opposing alliances, the new military technology that seemed to favor the defensive, and the logistical difficulties of sustaining massive offensives, it was unlikely that either side would achieve swift victory. Ironically, one man who realized this was the author of Germany's grand military strategy, the von Schlieffen plan. But his doubts came after he retired, at the end of his life.  

After horrendous losses from repeated offensives in the first four months of the war, both sides dug in.  Failed offensives causing massive casualties would continue for four more years. 

What strikes me is that foreign policy makers and military leaders in all the countries did not seem to think in terms of alternative scenarios or the longer-term political consequences if their offensive strategies failed.  With the exceptions of a young French officer named Charles de Gaulle, a few junior staff officers on the German General Staff, and the pessimistic thoughts of the head of the German General Staff in his private diary, no one seems to have thought ahead about how the war would be fought if neither alliance won a series of quick victories.  None of the men who started the war saw how a long war of attrition would end up destroying the social and political order they were trying to preserve.   

CONSEQUENCES

The immediate consequence was a war that mobilized over 60 million troops, caused 20 million military and civilian deaths and 21 million wounded. The European order of Bismarck and other conservatives was shattered, replaced by chaos and violence.

If the importance of an historical event is judged by its consequences, then World War I may be the most important historical event of the twentieth century.  Its immediate aftermath included:

• the elimination of four monarchies, including the Ottoman Empire.
• revolution in Russia, ending in a Communist government, civil war and invasion of Poland.
• the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires.
• small, new, weak countries in Central Europe.
• a Fascist government in Italy.
• political and economic instability in Germany, leading to Hitler, World War II and the Holocaust.
• English and French colonies and protectorates with arbitrary borders in the Middle East.
• independence for part of Ireland, leaving the question of Northern Ireland unsettled.
• a prolonged recession in England.
• the rise of two new potentially dominant world powers outside of Europe, America and Japan.

Equally important, economic historians who study the origins of the Great Depression generally believe the deepest underlying causes were the economic disruptions and instabilities created by World War I. The winners of the war could not, or would not, deal realistically with the economic dislocations. Criticisms of the disastrous economic policies of Winston Churchill in the 1920s by John Maynard Keynes had no effect. American exports of agricultural products to Europe fell drastically; a recession began in rural America in the 1920s. Thousands of rural banks failed. As the agricultural recession deepened in the 1930s, the rural banking system virtually collapsed, not all at once but in waves, prolonging the depression. 

In Germany, the combination of bitterness over losing the war and the economic effects of the Great Depression would contribute to the rise and eventual success of Hitler and the Nazis. In the 1920s, the German army and navy were already planning on how to win the next war.  Hitler would inherit a military with a strategy on how to reverse the results of World War I.  He would use it. 

History is the story of sudden, unexpected events with long tails and long consequences.

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READINGS: 

The Unraveling of the European Order

George F. Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order:  Franco-Russian Relations, 1875-1890

There are two valuable aspects to this book. The first is that this history gives a different perspective on the political factors leading up to World War I. The recent books on this topic concentrate on the immediate years before the war. They now appear to me to be incomplete, and somewhat misleading, in their analysis and conclusions. The second lessons is indirect. George Kennan is famous as the primary architect of America's foreign policy at the beginning of the Cold War. He retired later to write a number of books. I think this book, and its sequel, are an attempt by Kennan to look back to find the deep roots of Russian and Soviet foreign policy. A key conclusion is his insistence that a national psychology is a crucial input into Russian decisions. If he is right, if this psychological continuity exists, then this book is relevant to understanding current, and probably future, Russian foreign policy.

George F. Kennan, The Fateful Alliance:  France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War

This book is a continuation of Kennan’s earlier book, The Decline of Bismarck’s European Order. Shorter, more focused. Like Thucydides, Kennan seems to be looking for universal patterns, or at least relevant historical analogies.

Throughout the book, George Kennan describes and comments on the hermetic environment of the very small number of diplomats and generals making the secret treaties and understandings that increased the chances of a military confrontation of two alliances. This is ironic coming from Kennan, who was part of a very small elite group of “Wise Men” who made Cold War strategy.

There is a similarity to the diplomats and generals of the French Third Republic. Like them, The Wise Men seemed to believe that their “class” could conduct foreign policy in a political vacuum, without thinking about domestic politics, public opinion or democratic political institutions. I doubt if this is the historical analogy George Kennan intended. See Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World That They Made.

Kennan makes a major point of criticizing narrow military thinking to the exclusion of clear political objectives and flexible strategies. This reflects his feeling that his nuanced Cold War strategy against Russia was hijacked by the military, to the exclusion of exploring possible ways to reduce tension or reach limited detente. It is consistent that Kennan was skeptical and then critical of the Vietnam War, as were the surviving Wise Men.

In a summary, Kennan seems to be saying that only the presence of nuclear weapons kept Russia and the United States from going to war.

In the Introduction, Kennan says there will be a third book on the period 1894 to 1918. As far as I know, he never wrote this book. The two books he did write could have been preparatory to analyzing the seminal event of the 20th Century, the origins and outbreak of World War I. I can’t think of anyone who was better qualified to write this history. That he didn’t detracts from the value of these outstanding but narrowly focused histories.

The Origins of World War I

Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers:  How Europe Went to War in 1914

Detailed account of the diplomatic decision makers and the hermetic atmosphere they worked in. His analysis tends to undermine his thesis implied in the title.

Margaret Macmillan, The War That Ended Peace:  The Road to 1914.   

Broader in scope than The Sleepwalkers, Professor Macmillan factors in how conservative leaders in all the five major powers thought they could use nationalism and the threat of war to overcome the deep divisions in their societies and counter the internal threats to their elite positions.

Max Hastings, Catastrophe 1914:  Europe Goes to War

Good summary of research on first five months of the war.  Numbers mobilized and casualties in first months were huge.  All armies offensive but didn’t have the numerical superiority and logistics to sustain attacks.  All countries’ war plans defective, leading to stalemate.  Trench warfare by the end of 1914.

Nick Lloyd, Hundred Days:  The Campaign That Ended World War I

Excellent, lucid history of a difficult, complicated topic.  Emphasizes that the Allies finally learned the lessons from earlier mistakes.   Foch and Haig came up with a winning strategy and new tactics. Had firepower and manpower advantages after failed German offensives of 1918 and the arrival of American troops.  Preview of WWII as Allies coordinated use of tanks, airplanes and more flexible infantry/artillery tactics.  Unfortunately, lessons learned by Germans, not Allies.

Vienna and the Austro-Hungarian Empire

John Stoye, The Siege of Vienna:  The Last Great Trial Between Cross and Crescent

Detailed account of Ottoman Turk siege of Vienna in 1683.  Ottoman defeat led to the eventual loss of much of the Balkans and reorientation of Habsburg foreign policy from west to east.  Roots of later conflicts in the Balkans.  Shows how extremely complicated European politics were.

Philipp Blom, The Vertigo Years:  Europe, 1900-1914.  2008.

Despite the book's structure of picking one theme in each year, surprisingly insightful look at the years before WWI.  Attemps at parallels to current (or continuing) society.  Emphasizes psychological stress and social disruption caused by economic change, and their political and cultural consequences.  Like Schorske’s book, does not delve too deeply into causes.

Carl Schorske, Fin-De-Siecle Vienna:  Politics and Culture

Brilliant book on how the liberal, capitalist, upper middle classes lost political and cultural dominance in Vienna.  Symbolized by the Ringstrasse and the buildings on it.  Rise of mass movements to challenge existing political order, including the use of anti-Semitism as a reactionary political weapon.  (Observed by a young Adolf Hitler.)  Cultural (and psychoanalytic) attack on rationalist and ordered culture of Vienna.  In the background, gradual disintegration of Austro-Hungarian Empire.  Nice tie-in with Morton’s book.

Eric Kandel, The Age of Insight:  The Quest to Understand the Unconscious in Art, Mind, and Brain, from Vienna 1900 to the Present

Brilliant book.  Worthy successor to Schorske.  Attempts to link innovations in thinking in medicine, psychology and art, with the theme of looking below the surface.  Origins of one psychology of the mind and influence on later art criticism.  Interesting that Freud didn’t seem to be interested in modern art in Vienna or had more contact with contemporary artists.  Author also argues painters seemed to be more interested in the psychology of women than Freud, whose explanations were superficial and stereotyped.

Frederic Morton, Thunder at Twilight:  Vienna 1913/1914

A number of extraordinary stories filled with irony.  How Vienna miscalculated.  Vignettes of famous people in Vienna during this period.

Geoffrey Wawro,  A Mad Catastrophe:  The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire.  2014.

Excellent history of the combination of unreality, arrogance and stupidity of the military and political leaders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire that led to World War I.  Mostly a military history of the performance of the Austro-Hungarian army during the first year of the war.  Incredible incompetence leading to defeats and horrific casualties.

The Immediate Aftermath of World War I

Robert Gerwarth, The Vanquished:  Why the First World War Failed to End

The clear detailing of the chaos, violence, ethnic hatreds and political instability in the six years after the end of World War I, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. While some political stability (and less violence) occurred after 1923, the author argues that the weak governments could not deal with the economic and political chaos created by the Great Depression. The weak democratic government of Germany was discredited and voters dramatically increased their support of far left and far right parties.

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WHY THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR II WAS DIFFERENT THAN THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR I

World War I was the first time America sent a large army to fight in Europe and took part in the post-war peace negotiations. President Wilson attempted at the Versailles peace negotiations to construct a post-war world based on "national self-determination," democracy, and collective security. This raised expectations of a "just peace" without retribution, and even decolonization. Not to be. The creation of a Communist Russia supporting revolution in Germany and Central Europe (and unsuccessfully invading Finland and Poland), political chaos and violence in Germany and Central Europe, ethnic hatreds in the new countries of Europe, and weak democratic institutions made it exceeding difficult to implement Wilson's ideals. In addition, France was more concerned about punishing Germany, and England and France wanted to preserve and extend their empires. Americans at home became quickly disillusioned and returned to isolationism. Authoritarian leaders and parties in Europe promised order in place of the chaos of parliamentary democracy. Exploiting the bitterness of the Italian experience in the war and ensuing political chaos, Mussolini and the Fascists came to power promising order. The Great Depression strengthened the appeal of other extremist, anti-democractic parties, most tragically in the rise to power of Hitler and the Nazis in Germany. The result was World War II.

Why was the outcome of World War II different? The same chaos and violence in Europe was present. But Soviet Russian rule of most of Central Europe suppressed potential conflicts in this unstable region. Ethnic hatred in the Balkans were controlled by a Communist Yugoslavia. On the other side, America did not retreat from Europe. Reacting to the threat of Soviet Russia, The United States supported and subsidized a program of economic reconstruction and democratic institutions in Western Europe. The European Union was created, to foster economic integration rather than national rivalry. NATO was created to provide military protection, ensuring a permanent American presence. Decolonization began. International institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank were established, partly to contain a repeat of the contagion of economic slumps.

It was the political and ideological rivalry of the Soviet Union and the United States, rather than the political rivalry of traditional European "Great Powers," that determined the shape of the post-World War II world.

In a later post, I will argue that this post-WWII structure is coming to an end and we are returning to a world that somewhat resembles the world before World War I. Universal ideological themes like Communism and democracy are becoming less important. Narrower nationalist objectives are reasserting themselves at the expense of supranational structures created after World War Two. Rising internal tensions in many nation-states are having important influences on foreign policies.
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For readers with an interest in history, a deeper look at the causes of World War I can be found in Europe on the Brink of World War One.

Go back to Guide to Posts by Topic.