Superpower: The United States and Terrorism
When al Qaeda struck the World Trade towers and the Pentagon in 2001, the United States had been the world’s only superpower for ten years. But what does it mean to be a superpower in the modern world? A world of over 200 countries, multinational corporations, global financial markets, global mobility of people and information, and a myriad of competing groups like non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Human Rights Watch, global religious groups, drug cartels and terrorist groups. How much power does the United States have to control, or at least influence, events outside the United States? What does it depend on?
As throughout history, it partly depends on the strategic choices made by the political leadership of the superpower and how skillfully that leadership reacts to opportunities.
Al Qaeda overplayed its hand with the attack on the World Trade center. As the only superpower, there was a lot of resentment aimed against the United States. Countries and NGOs that didn’t like any modern trend could focus their anger on the United States, which was identified with the global economy, democracy, tolerance, popular culture, pollution, economic dominance and anything else they didn’t like. But al Qaeda’s attack did something extraordinary. The horrific images lead to an unexpected outpouring of sympathy for the United States. Many other countries, especially in Europe, had a growing Muslim population and could easily imagine that they could also be targets, a fear that would be realized in the future. Russia and China (geopolitical rivals), India and the Philippines were reminded that they also had political problems with Muslim minorities in their countries and on their borders.
The United States had an unexpected opportunity to form a de facto global alliance aimed at Muslim terrorists. Limited cooperation in this area of mutual security interest could lead to further cooperation in related areas. National and regional conflicts of interest or differences of opinion (such as how to fight global warming) might have had a better chance of being muted or negotiated.
I think to a large extent the United States did not exploit this opportunity. Just the opposite; strident, arrogant, “go it alone” rhetoric has dissipated much of this goodwill. But future attacks by Muslim extremists groups in other countries might create new opportunities.
If the attack presented the United States with an opportunity, there was also a huge danger. Muslim extremists groups could, and did, emphasize the theme that this attack was part of a global religious war between Islam and Christianity (or modernism or secularism or all three). If the United States reacted by appearing to attack or even criticize Muslims in general, al Qaeda and other extremists groups would score a propaganda victory in the Muslim world. It appears that the United States has generally avoided this trap.
There was another unexpected opportunity. The ultimate targets of groups like al Qaeda were the 20 or so secular Muslim states. Fundamentalist Muslim groups would like to come to power to institute governments like those of Iran, Gaza or the Taliban in Afghanistan. Many of these states, including Saudi Arabia, Libya, Pakistan and Syria supported extremist groups outside their countries. Others, like Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Indonesia, Lebanon and Jordan, have problems with fundamentalist Muslim groups inside their countries.
The attack on the United States probably increased the prestige of these groups among part of the Muslim population and therefore the threat they posed for secular Muslim states. The opportunity was that these secular Muslim would stop supporting extremist Muslim groups, which were now a more visible threat to them.
After orchestrating the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the United States did something stupid. It attacked a major Muslim secular state, Iraq. The rationales were flimsy at best and cynical at worst. A large American-led force of infidels was now in the heart of the Muslim Middle East. Anti-American Muslim groups now had a target closer to home on Muslim soil. The United States was running the risk of precipitating the religious war it was trying to avoid.
So far, the political damage from this move seems to have been minimal. Secular Muslim states, or their political and military elites, have come to realize that supporting or tolerating extremist Muslim groups does not buy them internal security. Bombings in Saudi Arabia, Syria and Pakistan, and the attempted assassination of Qaddafi in Libya, have led to attempts at internal political crackdowns and probably less support for external political groups. All of these countries have increased cooperation with the United States in attempting to suppress terrorist groups, although they have continued to have ties with some groups. Looking at their own national self-interest and security, it appears that the U.S. invasion of Iraq has had less negative consequences than it might have had because of terrorist attacks inside of secular Muslim states.
But the invasions of Iraq diverted resources and focus on keeping the Taliban and al Qaeda from coming to power in Afghanistan. As in Iraq, enemies of the United States know that the U.S. will not be able to keep a permanent occupying military force in the country. All factions in both countries, and in Pakistan, are planning on their strategy when the Americans leave. So should the United States. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, there are groups opposed to the Taliban and al Qaeda. Half the people in Afghanistan are members of minority groups that suffered under the earlier Taliban government. The United States should start now supporting these groups with money, training and weapons. If the Taliban does come to power, they should face the type of guerilla warfare now waged against the United States.
It seems strange that politicians and military strategists do not seem to have learned anything from the war in Vietnam, or from studying Russia's war in Afghanistan.
There is one other danger for the United States. U.S influence in the world also depends on the ideals it projects and promotes in the world. If it appears that to fight terrorism the United States condones torture, limits civil liberties, allows illegal wiretapping and generally seems to be a less tolerant society, then it will lessen American influence abroad and compromise American ideals at home.
As throughout history, it partly depends on the strategic choices made by the political leadership of the superpower and how skillfully that leadership reacts to opportunities.
Al Qaeda overplayed its hand with the attack on the World Trade center. As the only superpower, there was a lot of resentment aimed against the United States. Countries and NGOs that didn’t like any modern trend could focus their anger on the United States, which was identified with the global economy, democracy, tolerance, popular culture, pollution, economic dominance and anything else they didn’t like. But al Qaeda’s attack did something extraordinary. The horrific images lead to an unexpected outpouring of sympathy for the United States. Many other countries, especially in Europe, had a growing Muslim population and could easily imagine that they could also be targets, a fear that would be realized in the future. Russia and China (geopolitical rivals), India and the Philippines were reminded that they also had political problems with Muslim minorities in their countries and on their borders.
The United States had an unexpected opportunity to form a de facto global alliance aimed at Muslim terrorists. Limited cooperation in this area of mutual security interest could lead to further cooperation in related areas. National and regional conflicts of interest or differences of opinion (such as how to fight global warming) might have had a better chance of being muted or negotiated.
I think to a large extent the United States did not exploit this opportunity. Just the opposite; strident, arrogant, “go it alone” rhetoric has dissipated much of this goodwill. But future attacks by Muslim extremists groups in other countries might create new opportunities.
If the attack presented the United States with an opportunity, there was also a huge danger. Muslim extremists groups could, and did, emphasize the theme that this attack was part of a global religious war between Islam and Christianity (or modernism or secularism or all three). If the United States reacted by appearing to attack or even criticize Muslims in general, al Qaeda and other extremists groups would score a propaganda victory in the Muslim world. It appears that the United States has generally avoided this trap.
There was another unexpected opportunity. The ultimate targets of groups like al Qaeda were the 20 or so secular Muslim states. Fundamentalist Muslim groups would like to come to power to institute governments like those of Iran, Gaza or the Taliban in Afghanistan. Many of these states, including Saudi Arabia, Libya, Pakistan and Syria supported extremist groups outside their countries. Others, like Egypt, Algeria, Yemen, Indonesia, Lebanon and Jordan, have problems with fundamentalist Muslim groups inside their countries.
The attack on the United States probably increased the prestige of these groups among part of the Muslim population and therefore the threat they posed for secular Muslim states. The opportunity was that these secular Muslim would stop supporting extremist Muslim groups, which were now a more visible threat to them.
After orchestrating the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the United States did something stupid. It attacked a major Muslim secular state, Iraq. The rationales were flimsy at best and cynical at worst. A large American-led force of infidels was now in the heart of the Muslim Middle East. Anti-American Muslim groups now had a target closer to home on Muslim soil. The United States was running the risk of precipitating the religious war it was trying to avoid.
So far, the political damage from this move seems to have been minimal. Secular Muslim states, or their political and military elites, have come to realize that supporting or tolerating extremist Muslim groups does not buy them internal security. Bombings in Saudi Arabia, Syria and Pakistan, and the attempted assassination of Qaddafi in Libya, have led to attempts at internal political crackdowns and probably less support for external political groups. All of these countries have increased cooperation with the United States in attempting to suppress terrorist groups, although they have continued to have ties with some groups. Looking at their own national self-interest and security, it appears that the U.S. invasion of Iraq has had less negative consequences than it might have had because of terrorist attacks inside of secular Muslim states.
But the invasions of Iraq diverted resources and focus on keeping the Taliban and al Qaeda from coming to power in Afghanistan. As in Iraq, enemies of the United States know that the U.S. will not be able to keep a permanent occupying military force in the country. All factions in both countries, and in Pakistan, are planning on their strategy when the Americans leave. So should the United States. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, there are groups opposed to the Taliban and al Qaeda. Half the people in Afghanistan are members of minority groups that suffered under the earlier Taliban government. The United States should start now supporting these groups with money, training and weapons. If the Taliban does come to power, they should face the type of guerilla warfare now waged against the United States.
It seems strange that politicians and military strategists do not seem to have learned anything from the war in Vietnam, or from studying Russia's war in Afghanistan.
There is one other danger for the United States. U.S influence in the world also depends on the ideals it projects and promotes in the world. If it appears that to fight terrorism the United States condones torture, limits civil liberties, allows illegal wiretapping and generally seems to be a less tolerant society, then it will lessen American influence abroad and compromise American ideals at home.
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